On the history and use of some standard statistical models by Lehmann, E. L.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
5.
28
38
v1
  [
ma
th.
ST
]  
19
 M
ay
 20
08
IMS Collections
Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of David A. Freedman
Vol. 2 (2008) 114–126
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2008
DOI: 10.1214/193940307000000419
On the history and use of some standard
statistical models
E. L. Lehmann1
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract: This paper tries to tell the story of the general linear model, which
saw the light of day 200 years ago, and the assumptions underlying it. We
distinguish three principal stages (ignoring earlier more isolated instances).
The model was first proposed in the context of astronomical and geodesic
observations, where the main source of variation was observational error. This
was the main use of the model during the 19th century.
In the 1920’s it was developed in a new direction by R.A. Fisher whose
principal applications were in agriculture and biology. Finally, beginning in
the 1930’s and 40’s it became an important tool for the social sciences. As
new areas of applications were added, the assumptions underlying the model
tended to become more questionable, and the resulting statistical techniques
more prone to misuse.
1. Introduction
It was 200 years ago, in 1805, that Legendre first published the method of least
squares and a vague formulation of what has come to be known as the standard
linear model [27]. This model has played a central role in the statistical methodology
used in the physical, biological and social sciences, and it is the aim of the present
paper to sketch this role. I am not trying to write a history of the linear model2,
but am mainly concerned with the role the underlying assumptions have played in
these three areas of application.
The model (defined in Section 6) assumes that each observation is the sum of two
components: a deterministic term (which is a linear combination of the relevant ex-
planatory variables) and a random term representing error or other “disturbances”.
The error terms are assumed to be independently, identically distributed (i.i.d.) ac-
cording to a common normal distribution, and Sections 2–5 are therefore concerned
with the role of these assumptions in the special case of the simple normal i.i.d.
model. This model is of interest also in its own right as the standard model for the
one-sample problem. Sections 6 and 7 take up issues concerning the non-random
term of the linear model.
To conclude this introduction, let me briefly consider the general nature of math-
ematical, and particularly statistical, models.
1University of California, Department of Statistics, 367 Evans Hall #3860, Berkeley, CA 94720-
3860, USA, e-mail: shaffer@stat.berkeley.edu
AMS 2000 subject classifications: 62A01, 62-03, 62J05.
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2For accounts of this history see Seal [41] and Plackett [38], and in a broader context Stigler
[45] and Hald [20].
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The first use of the term “model” by a statistician that I have found occurs in
Karl Pearson’s Grammar of Science [33]. In this book he emphasizes the distinction
between the real phenomenon and the model, which he usually calls “conception”,
but to which on a few occasions he refers as “models”. For example he writes [33],
p. 206:
“The scientist postulates nothing in the world beyond sense [i.e. sense perceptions];
for him the atom and the ether are–like the geometric surface–models by which he
resumes the world of sense.
The role and construction of mathematical models played a central role in the
work of the mathematician Richard von Mises (1883-1953) who developed such
models for a number of disciplines, among them aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and
plasticity. Besides undertaking these efforts in the physical sciences, von Mises felt
that there was a great need for a similar treatment of probability theory. Instead
of relying on Laplace’s inadequate definition in terms of equally likely cases, he
wanted to build a model for probability that would represent the physical reality
underlying this concept.
In his fundamental paper of 1919 on the foundations of probability theory [48],
he describes his approach as follows [my translation from the German]:
“The present treatment is based on the assumption that probability theory is a
natural science, of the same kind as geometry or theoretical mechanics. It has the
aim to present the relations and dependencies of specific observable phenomenon, not
as a faithful description of reality, but as its abstraction and idealization.”
The observable phenomenon for which the paper builds a model is the stability
of the long-run frequency of an outcome in a long sequence of repeated random
events, for example, the frequency of heads in a long sequence of tosses of a coin.
The principal constituents of the model are infinite sequences of trials with random
outcomes, of which it is assumed that the frequency of a given outcome tends to a
limit. To define randomness, von Mises requires that the same limit should obtain in
any predetermined subsequence which can be chosen in the light of the observations
up to this point.
It turned out that this formulation was too complicated; it was also too narrow
in that it only applied to situations which allowed a large number of repetitions.
As a formulation of probability theory it was replaced by a quite different approach
proposed by Kolmogorov [23]. Kolmogorov did not construct a model for probability
theory. Instead, he stated a small number of very simple axioms which any ideal
model should satisfy. In this system probability itself was left undefined, subject
only to these axioms. In this way the system could be interpreted and fleshed out
not only by the frequency concept of probability but also by the idea of probability
as degree of belief (The background of Kolmogorov’s formulation is discussed in
Shafer and Vovk [42]).
Although von Mises’ modeling approach was not the one that was ultimately
adopted by the profession, it nevertheless exerted great influence, particularly on
Kolmogorov who cited the effect it had on his own formulation and who later took
it as a starting point of a renewed effort to get a grip on the crucial (and difficult)
concept of randomness3.
3For a more detailed review of these foundational issues, see von Plato [49].
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2. The assumption of normality in the 19th century
The most widely used statistical model for a sequence of repeated measurements
has been the i.i.d. normal model according to which the observations are indepen-
dently distributed with a common normal distribution. The first person to write
down the formula for what today is called the normal density was De Moivre [10]
who derived it as the limit of the binomial but did not consider it as a probability
density in its own right. It was only in the beginning of the 19th Century through
the combined insights of Laplace and Gauss that the central role of the normal
distribution was realized. The normal distribution became the acknowledged model
for the distribution of errors of physical (particularly astronomical) measurements
and was called the Law of Errors.4 It had a theoretical basis in the so called Law of
Elementary Errors which assumed that an observational error is the sum of a large
number of small independent errors and is therefore approximately normally dis-
tributed by the Central Limit Theorem. This argument was reinforced by extensive
experience which showed good approximate agreement with the normal form.
The many textbooks on the subject all agreed on this point. For example, Brunt
[6, 7], after citing theoretical arguments in favor of the normal distribution, states
that “the final justification of Gauss’ error curve rests upon the fact that it works
well in practice and yields curves which in very many cases agree very closely with
the observed frequency curves. The normal law is to be regarded as proved by
experience and explained by Hagen’s hypothesis [i.e. the law of elementary errors.]”
In a German text, Helmert [21, 22] explains [my translation]: “The form of the
distribution of errors can only be determined through observation. . . . According to
experience the [norma] law usually provides a close approximation.”
Similar statements can be found in other British, German and French texts.
The history of the Theory of Errors is recounted in meticulous detail in a book on
the subject by Czuber [9]. It was realized of course that the normal law could only
be an approximation since in practice the observations were discrete and bounded.
Nevertheless, as Czuber writes [my translation]:
“An essential support of Gauss’ Law of Errors is provided by the agreement which
exists between its consequences and the results of observations that have really been
obtained. It has led to the general acceptance by observers despite the concerns that
can be raised against the various theoretical arguments in its favor.”
Czuber devotes 14 pages to empirical comparisons of the law of errors with
experience, and another section to the “elimination of contradictory observations”
[i.e. gross errors], because it is only after such “doubtful observations” have been
removed that the law applies.
He analyzes seven data sets from astronomy and geodesy, and in addition some
experimental results of measurements carried out specifically to test the Gaussian
law. His method in these examples is to compare the numbers of observations in var-
ious intervals with those predicted by theory. His conclusion is that the agreement
is “satisfactory”.
It should be noted that when Czuber mentions the general acceptance of the
law, this statement is implicitly restricted to the principal areas of application he
considers: the physical sciences and particularly astronomy and geodesy.
The normal distribution lost its exclusive position toward the end of the 19th
Century when a strong interest developed in systematic application of statistical
4The term “normal distribution” was first suggested by Peirce [37], Lexis [28] and Galton [16]
and began to take hold in the 1880’s (see Stigler [46], Chapter 22).
On the history and use of some standard statistical models 117
methods to biological, sociological and economic investigations. There the distri-
butions encountered were often far from normal and frequently asymmetric. As a
result, families of models were developed that include skewed and heavy-tailed dis-
tributions. The most influential of these at the time was the system proposed by
Karl Pearson [34]. Stigler [45] (p. 335) explains Pearson’s success:
“In thirty pages of detailed examples he demonstrated the successful flexibility and
practicality of the system with a force that bludgeoned any potential skeptic into
submission. The examples ranged from Venn’s barometric pressures to the heights of
St. Louis school girls to Weldon’s crabs to statistics on pauperism . . . . Not only was
his work more general than others, it was practical and came to public view with a
record of proven accomplishment.”
3. Fisher and the assumption of normality
Early in the 20th Century the normal distribution regained its ascendancy through
the small sample work of R.A. Fisher. As Geary [17] summarized the situation in
a historical overview:
“Our historian will find a significant change of attitude a quarter of a century ago
following the brilliant work of R.A. Fisher who showed that when universal normal-
ity could be assumed, inferences of the widest practical usefulness could be drawn.
Prejudice in favor of normality returned in full force and interest in non-normality
receded in the background.”
But could universal normality be assumed? Fisher developed his new methods
not in the context of astronomical measurements but for application to biological
and agricultural data, and here the assumption is on much shakier ground.
In the earlier applications, the principal source of variation in the observations
was observational error. Now to this is added the variability of the subjects (trees,
agricultural plots, farms, . . . ) being measured. These subjects Fisher modeled as
random samples from an infinite population, and he based his derivations on the
assumption that the population distribution of the characteristic being measured
is normal. But this distribution depends on the nature of the population, and the
basis for such an assumption in these circumstances often is weak.
Fisher’s treatment of the assumptions of normality in his enormously successful
1925 book, “Statistical Methods for Research Workers” (SMRW) [11], gave rise to a
heated controversy between Fisher and E.S. Pearson. The conflict had its origin in
Pearson’s 1929 review of the 2nd Edition of SMRW for the journal “Nature”. On the
whole the review was favorable, but it contained the following critical paragraph.
“There is one criticism however which must be made from the statistical point of view.
A large number of these tests are based . . . on the assumption that the population
sampled is of the ‘normal’ form. That this is the case can be gathered from a careful
reading of the test, but the point is not sufficiently emphasized. It does not appear
reasonable to lay stress on the ‘exactness’ of the tests when no means whatever are
given of appreciating how rapidly they became inexact as the population sampled
diverges from normality. That the tests, for example, connected with the analysis of
variance [here he is referring to the F -test for variances] are far more dependent on
normality than those involved Student’s z (or t) distribution is almost certain, but
no clear indication of the need for caution in their application is given.”
To make things worse, the review also contained the sentence: “It would seem
wiser in the long-run even in a textbook, to admit the incompleteness of theory in
this direction, rather than risk giving the reader the impression that the solution
of all his problems has been achieved.”
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In defense of his criticism,5 Pearson (in a letter to Gosset) cited a paper by
the American economist Tolley [47] which showed that its author indeed had been
misled by Fisher’s book. Tolley wrote:
“Recently the English School of Statisticians has developed formulas and probability
tables to accompany them which, they state, are applicable regardless of the form
of the frequency distribution. These formulas are given, most of them without proof,
in Fisher’s book [11] . . . . If we accept the statements of those who have developed
these newer formulas, skew frequency distributions and small samples need cause no
further difficulty as far as measurement of error is concerned.”
Fisher was shaken by Tolley’s misunderstanding and in a letter to Gosset (June
27, 1929) admitted some culpability:
“The claim of exactness for the solutions and tests given was wrong, although a
careful reader would find that I had kept within the letter of the law by hidden
allusions to normality.”
A careful reading of SMWR concerning its treatment of normality in fact shows
the following.
1. For some of the results, the assumption is stated (though never emphasized).
2. More often, results are stated without any qualifications.
3. The treatment of examples is very deficient in this respect. As Gosset pointed
out to Fisher (June 24, 1929):
“Although when you think about it you agree that ‘exactness’ or even appropriate
use depends on normality, in practice you don’t consider the question at all when
you apply your tables to your examples: not one word.”
4. In the chapter on distributions (which introduces the normal, Poisson and bino-
mial and no others), Fisher states that it is important to know “the experimental
conditions upon which they occur.” However, neither this nor any later chapter
contains any discussion of the conditions under which data can be expected to
be normally distributed (not one word, as Gosset might say.)
5. Another important omission (not even taken up in later editions after it had been
pointed out by Pearson) is the great sensitivity to the assumption of normality
in tests of variances (rather than means), which make these tests essentially
useless.
This criticism must of course be seen against the background of the enormous
achievements and novelty of the book. In the process of making accessible Fisher’s
research of the preceding decade, it established a new paradigm and revolutionized
statistical methodology.
The book provides little information about Fisher’s own attitude toward the
assumption of normality, which forms the basis of his work on the analysis of vari-
ance, covariance and regression. The clearest statement of his position that I have
been able to find is in a letter of 1929 to “Nature” entitled “Statistics and bi-
ological research”, which was the concluding document in the controversy with
Pearson. Basing his defense of the assumption on experience rather than theory,
Fisher claims:
“On the practical side there is little enough room for anxiety, especially among biolo-
gists, who are used to checking the adequacy of their methods by control experiments.
The difficulty of obtaining decisive results often flows from heterogeneity of materials,
often from causes of bias, often, too, from the difficulty of setting up an experiment
in such a way as to obtain a valid estimate of errors. I have never known difficulty to
5For more details on this controversy see Pearson [32] and the Fisher-Gosset correspondence
(Gosset [18]).
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arise in biological work from imperfect normality of the variation, often though I have
examined data for this particular cause of difficulty; nor is there, I believe, any case
to contrary in the literature. This is not to say that the deviation from ‘Student’s’
t-distribution found by Shewhart and Winters [43], for samples from rectangular and
triangular distributions, may not have a real application in some technological work,
but rather that such deviations have not been found, and are scarcely to be looked
for, in biological research and ordinarily conducted.”
Fisher is not so naive as to claim universal normality even for the kind of bio-
logical data with which he is dealing. What he claims instead is that his methods
are insensitive to departures from normality, in modern terminology that they are
fairly robust against non-normality. This turned out, as Pearson had already dis-
covered through simulation studies, to be true for tests of means but not for tests of
variances. (However, even for means a theorem of Bahadur and Savage [3] suggest
the need for some caution. They showed that for any given sample size, no matter
how large, there exist distributions for which the size of the t-test is arbitrarily close
to 1.)
4. The role of normality after Fisher
Fisher’s “Statistical Methods” was enormously influential. Together with the work
on which it was based it was the most important instrument for the movement from
19th Century large-sample to 20th Century small-sample statistics. The volume
sold well, particularly considering how small the statistical community was at the
time. A second edition became necessary in 1928 and a third in 1930, with the first
three editions selling 1050, 1250 and 1500 copies respectively. This flow continued
throughout Fisher’s life with new editions appearing every 2 to 3 years.
However, in the 1930’s other texts also began to bring the new methodology to
ever widening audiences. By far the most successful of these was George Snedecor’s
“Statistical Methods” [44], which was published in 1937, and the seven editions of
which sold the unparalleled number of 237,000 copies. For several years it was one
of the most cited publications in the Science Citation Index, and in 1995 still had
nearly 2000 entries.6
Snedecor’s book is essentially a more clearly written, simpler, very user-friendly,
version of Fisher’s SMRW. It also contains a large number of numerical examples,
mainly from agriculture and biology. The book avoids complications and pays prac-
tically no attention to the assumptions underlying the recommended procedures
including the assumption of normality. This is in line with Snedecor’s philosophy
which he explains in the Preface:
“To the mathematical statistician must be delegated the task of developing the theory
and devising the methods, accompanying these latter by adequate statements of the
limitations of their use (my italics).”
He adds that “None but the biologist can decide whether the conditions are
fulfilled in his experiments.” This seems begging the question because how can the
biologists or other users make this decision when they are not clearly told what are
the conditions.
This lack of attention to assumptions is shared by most of the many texts on
statistics in the 40’s and 50’s that followed those of Fisher and Snedecor. A fairly
comprehensive look at the role of the assumptions underlying Fisher’s small-sample
methods was provided in 1959 by Scheffe´ in his book “The Analysis of Variance”
6Cited from Carriquiri and David [8].
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[40], in a justly famous chapter of nearly 40 pages entitled “The effects of departures
from the underlying assumptions.”
Scheffe´ measures the departure of a distribution from normality in terms of
the coefficients γ1 of skewness and γ2 of kurtosis, the standardized 3rd and 4th
moments. For any symmetric distribution γ1 = 0, and for the normal distribution
also γ2 = 0. In the introduction to the chapter, he provides an idea of the range
of (γ1, γ2) in engineering data, in routine chemical analyses, in ages of marriage, in
barometric heights, and in the length and breadth of beans.
Scheffe´ points out that for large n the distribution of Student’s t is approximately
normal and hence “the inferences about the mean which are valid in the case of
normality must be correct for large n regardless of the form of the population.”
This is followed by a discussion of the effect of non-normality on the χ2-test for
variance, where it is shown that non-normality causes serious errors. Thus, Scheffe´
concludes that
“the effect of violation of the normality assumption is slight on inferences about the
mean but dangerous on inferences about variances.”
He points out that these results had already been noted by E. S. Pearson [31],
and their reason by Box [4].
However, Scheffe´’s concern is an exception. The standard textbook attitude to-
ward the assumption of normality is well summarized by Brownlee [5] (p. 179):
“It is presumably on this foundation [that means are approximately normal by the
Central Limit Theorem] that applied statisticians have found empirically that usually
there is no great need to fuss about the normality assumption. After a statistician has
analyzed several quite widely differing transformations of a variable in a fair number
of specific instances and found that the conclusions reached are substantially identical
for all the transformations, then he ceases to worry unduly about the normality
assumption in most situations.”
5. The assumption of independence
The standard model for the one-sample problem, i.e. for a number of repeated
measurements or other observations of a common quantity, assumed not only that
the observations are normally distributed but also that they are independent. This
assumption has received much less attention than the assumption of normality.
As Kruskal [26] states: “An almost universal assumption in statistical models for
repeated measurements of real-word quantities is that these measurements are in-
dependent, yet we know that such independence is fragile.”
As an explanation of the casual assumption of independence he suggests:
“One answer is ignorance. . . . Far more important than simple ignorance, is seduc-
tive simplicity: It is so easy to multiply marginal probabilities, formulas simplify,
and manipulation is relatively smooth, so the investigator neglects dependence, or
hopes that it makes little difference. Sometimes the hope is realized, but more often
dependence can make a tremendous difference.”
In many situations, the assumption of independence seems natural, even obvi-
ous, because of the absence of any direct influence of one observation on another.
However, a “spurious” (but nevertheless very real) dependence may be caused by
the presence of a common factor. This phenomenon was investigated (and the term
“spurious correlation” coined) by Karl Pearson in two papers of 1897 and 1902
[35, 36], in which he reports extensive experiments on measurements carried out by
himself.
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A difficulty for any serious investigation of the affect of dependence is the great
variety of forms that dependence can take. Even Scheffe´, who includes a discussion
of dependence in his chapter on failures of assumptions (mentioned in the preceding
section) cannot do more than examine two or three special cases. His conclusion:
“The effect of correlation in the observations can be very serious on inferences about
means.”
Following Scheffe´, many of the later books on linear models and regression anal-
ysis included discussion of the effects of non-normality, dependence, and inequality
of variances. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is Miller [30] who provides a
careful treatment of these issues as an integral part of each chapter of his book.
There was also a trickle-down effect on some of the more general introductions to
statistical methods. Thus, the seventh (1980) edition of Snedecor’s text (Snedecor
had died in 1974 and Cochran had become a co-author) contained a substantial
chapter on “Failure in the assumptions”. Its treatment of dependence closely par-
alleled that of Scheffe´ and in particular also warned about the effect of dependence
on the t-test.
6. The linear model
The previous sections have been concerned with the i.i.d. normal model for the
one-sample problem, i.e. for repeated measurements or observations of the same
quantity. In the remainder of the paper we shall consider the general linear model
where the same issues arise as well as some new ones.
The model is given by
Yi =
n∑
j=1
xijβj + εi (i = 1, . . . , n)
where the Y ’s are the observed values, the x’s are known constants, the β’s unknown
parameters, and the ε’s the errors. Of the ε’s it is typically assumed that they are
independently normally distributed with mean 0 and common variance σ2.
This model and the proposal to estimate the β’s by means of least squares, are
due to Gauss and Legendre at the beginning of the 19th Century. Known as the
theory of combinations of observations, the resulting methodology, applied primar-
ily to astronomy and geodesy, became the principal statistical activity throughout
much of the 19th Century, with many textbooks devoted to it. (When Gosset in
1904 needed statistical methods for his brewery work, his main sources of infor-
mation were Airy’s [1] (3rd Ed) book with the ponderous title “On the Algebraic
and Numerical Theory of Errors of Observations” and Merriman’s “A Textbook on
Least Squares” [29]. As Stigler [45] (p.11) puts it: “The method of least squares was
the dominant theme – the leitmotif – of nineteenth-century mathematical statistics.”
In this theory, probability calculations such as that of determining the probable
error of the estimates were carried out assuming large samples. In this way the
variance of the normal error distribution could be assumed known, and the estimates
(which were linear functions of the observations) could therefore be assumed to be
(approximately) normally distributed with known variance.
The linear model became a much more flexible instrument through Fisher’s in-
troduction of analysis of variance and covariance, and regression analysis. At the
same time he extended its application to the more complicated data of biology
with their complex sources of variation mentioned in Section 4. Fisher was able
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to overcome many of the difficulties arising in this extension through the use of
randomization and other aspects of experimental design set forth in his 1935 book
on this subject [12].
After Fisher’s biological applications, the linear model still faced one important
challenge: the application of regression models to the social sciences, particularly
to economics. Here in addition to the assumptions concerning the random terms εi
(normality and independence), questions concerning the adequacy of the structural
part Σxijβj became particularly important.
Freedman [15] (p. 9) compares the situation with that in astronomy where
“The relevant variables were known from Newtonian mechanics, and so were the func-
tional forms of the equations connecting them. Measurement could be done with high
precision. Much was known about the errors in the measurements and the equations.”
Regarding the corresponding issues in the social sciences, I shall here restrict
attention to economics7 where after some early isolated instances, statistical model
building was pursued systematically (beginning in the 1930’s) by writers such as
Tinbergen, Haavelmo [19] and Koopmans. It was developed further in the 1940’s
by the work of the Cowles Commission, which was then the center of economic
research. About these efforts Koopmans [24] points out that
“this theory has been widely applied to data obtained from agricultural experiments or from
measurements in biological populations. There are some essential differences between data of
this kind and those usually encountered in economic problems.
In agricultural experiments some of the determining variables can be completely controlled
by the experimenter . . . . Other determining variables less under his control are usually by their
nature subject to adequate independent variation. In that respect they bear a resemblance to
the variables representing measurable characteristics of individuals of a biological population
which is usually conceived as random drawings from a stable (my italics) probability distribu-
tion.
In economic analysis variables at the control of an experimenting institution are exceptional.
Further only a few types of variables . . . are so erratic in nature that they could reasonably be
regarded as drawings from any stable distribution . . . .
Further the relations between the variables studied in this type of analysis are themselves
subject to gradual or abrupt changes, according to institutional or technical changes in society
. . . . Therefore the number of observations from which the regression coefficients have to be
estimated is limited by the very nature of the problem.”
Commenting on the relative roles of the economist and the statistician in this
work, Koopmans states:
“The economist – or, in general, the expert in the field to which the dependent vari-
able belongs – should by economic reasoning and general economic experience. . . devise
a set of determining variables which he expects to be a complete set [i.e. such that
the effect of any additional variables can safely be absorbed into the error term].”
Koopmans makes it clear that the determination of the appropriate structural
part is not the task of the statistician but of the subject matter expert. This point
is also made by Arrow [2] when he states that
“The method of scientific investigation indicated in the preceding paragraphs calls
then for intensive a priori thinking to formulate a model, followed by the selection of
a best-fitting structure from that model by appropriate statistical techniques.”
Once the model has become formulated, statistical techniques make it possible
to deduce far-reaching conclusions. However the reliability of these conclusions is of
course limited by the reliability of the model. The difficulty of verifying the model
assumptions on the one hand, and the power of the statistical machinery to deliver
7For applications to psychology see Kru¨ger et al. [25] (Chapters 2 and 3).
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results on the other, have provided a fertile ground for misuse of the regression
methodology. The chief critic of this misuse has been David Freedman who over
the past 25 years has called attention to it, both in a series of close to 50 substantial
papers, and as a statistical consultant and expert witness in more than 100 cases.
As an example of Freedman’s criticism consider his detailed analysis of a book
by Hope, which deals with the effects of education on class mobility (Freedman
[13]). In this paper Freedman points out that
“one problem noticeable to a statistician is that investigators do not pay attention
to the stochastic assumptions behind the models. It does not seem possible to derive
these assumptions from current theory, nor are they easily validated empirically on
a case-by-case basis”
The paper ends with the devastating conclusion:
“My opinion is that investigators need to think more about the underlying process,
and look more closely at the data, without the distorting prism of conventional (and
largely irrelevant) stochastic models. Estimating nonexistent parameters cannot be
very fruitful. And it must be equally a waste of time to test theories on the basis of
statistical hypotheses that are rooted neither in prior theory nor in fact, even if the
algorithms are recited in every statistics text without caveat.”
The opening sentence of this conclusion suggests an alternative to the method-
ology Freedman is criticizing: better data, more substantive knowledge and input,
multiple studies under varying conditions as had been carried out for example in
establishing smoking as a major cause of lung cancer and other diseases. These
requirements had been foreshadowed in the passages from Koopmans and Arrow
cited earlier in this section.
Freedman capped his long involvements in these issues as scientist, consultant
and expert witness with a text: “Statistical Models–Theory and Practice” [15]. As
the title suggests, the book provides an account not only of the theory of statistical
modeling but also–through the careful examination of many real-life examples–a
guide to how such modeling should and should not be used.
An additional valuable feature of the book is a review of the literature on sta-
tistical modeling which is both a resource and encouragement for further study.
7. Conclusions
This paper has been concerned with the assumptions underlying the linear model
and the special case of the normal i.i.d. model. It considered three assumptions:
normality, independence and in the more general case, the linear structure of the
deterministic part. Of these three, the assumption of normality has received by far
the most attention in the literature. For the i.i.d. case and a few simple linear models
it has led to an alternative nonparametric methodology which has been developed
to avoid it. Unfortunately these nonparametric methods are no help with respect
to dependence (or the inequality of variances, a topic we have not discussed here.)
A point emphasized by this survey is that different fields of study involve different
kinds of data and have very different modeling situations. Thus, when the only
source of variation is observational error, as often is the case in the physical sciences,
the situation is much simpler than in the biological sciences where one is dealing
with samples from a somewhat heterogeneous (but stable) population. And these
situations, in turn, are easier to handle than those of observational studies in the
social sciences where the populations are less stable and where random sampling
typically is not possible.
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This subject matter dependence creates a difficulty for general texts on statisti-
cal methods but it does not absolve them from responsibility. As a minimum, such
texts should provide warnings against the unsubstantiated use of standard models.
A useful cautionary example might be the F -test of variances with its strong depen-
dence on the assumption of normality. Even with the t-test which is fairly robust
against non-normality one should not tempt students into Tolley’s error (discussed
in Section 4).
A warning that should be included in such texts is the danger of the too facile
assumption of independence. Another distinction that would be worth mentioning
is that between observational and experimental studies, perhaps with references
to the literature (for example the book by Rosenbaum [39]) treating the special
methods developed for the former.
Though general statistics texts could, and should include, this kind of material,
they can only go so far. As mentioned by Koopmans, the statistician and the subject
matter specialist each have a role to play. A general text cannot provide the subject
matter knowledge and the special features that are needed for successful modeling
in specific cases. Experience with similar data is required, knowledge of theory and,
as Freedman points out: shoe leather.
Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Persi Diaconis and Juliet Shaffer for many
helpful critical comments.
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